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A FUNCTIONAL ROLE APPROACH TO
ANALYZING DIRECTOR STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS
Norman George*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, Roger Blough, former Chairman of the Board of the
United States Steel Corporation and now a practicing attorney with
a large New York law firm, listed ten guiding principles for vitalizing the role of the corporate director.1 The profile of what he termed
the "working director" included admonitions to avoid conflicting
interests and to keep fully informed of corporate affairs.2 Many
corporate counsel have also compiled guidelines for their firms'
directors, usually expressed pointedly in terms of "do's" and
"don'ts" specifically aimed at avoiding personal liability in the performance of their duties as directors.
The impetus for these guidelines, of course, is the increase of
litigation in which directors and officers are individually named as
defendants in actions based on the federal securities laws. It is axiomatic that the legal climate for business executives has changed
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.A., Ohio State University, 1950; M.B.A.,
University of Pittsburgh, 1954; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1962; J.D., Salmon P. Chase
College of Law, 1967. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Richard
Apostolik, University of Dayton School of Law.
1. Blough, The Outside Directorat Work on the Board, 45 N.Y. ST. L.J. 467, 472-74
(1973):
1. Acceptance of the responsibility of being a "working director" with "final
allegiance . . . to stockholders and not to a chief executive or to other directors."
2. Spending enough time in actual director work, including meetings "to have a
firm overseer grasp of the corporation's business and an informed judgment on its more
important affairs and the qualities of its officers. If this means being on fewer boards,
so be it."
3. The disclosure of possible conflicts of interest.
4. The obligation to satisfy himself with the corporation's organizational structure.
5. The obligation to ensure that all information regarding major corporate matters is communicated to the outside directors.
6. The support of "a retirement-for-age policy for directors."
7. Ensuring that management positions are occupied by highly qualified persons.
8. The making of "inquiries and volunteering viewpoints rather than only passing on questions advanced by management."
9. Persistent advocacy of one's point of view in the face of strong-minded management.
10. Full cooperation of management with the board.
2. Id. at 473.
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radically in recent years. Personal liability is no longer well buffered
by the relative explicitness of common law fraud, the shield of the
business judgment rule, or the generally short reach of state laws.
Standards defined in terms of negligence, due diligence, reasonable
investigation, and a sometimes rather liberal interpretation of scienter have greatly increased directors' and officers' vulnerability.
Alarms have been sounded as litigation has multiplied. Where
are the boundaries of culpability? The same corporate counsel who
compiled the lists mentioned above also conceded that it is impossible to circumscribe precisely the areas of potential director liability.
There is concern that fear of the legal hazards may diminish the
supply of qualified outside directors. Some have speculated that the
emerging standards require such a commitment of time and effort
that the only solution may be the professionalization of directorships, i.e., directors may be required to devote full time to serving
on only a few boards.3 While this may overstate the case somewhat,
there is reason for concern. Indicative of the problem is the recently
announced abandonment by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of plans to prepare and publish guidelines for directors
under the Securities Acts and the rules promulgated thereunder.,
Difficulties with interpreting materiality and applying negligence
concepts were cited as reasons for aborting the project.
It is clear that the law of director and officer liabilities is in a
state of flux. Even the recent Supreme Court decision in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,5 which has largely, though not completely,
resolved the "great debate" on negligence versus scienter in Rule
10b-56 actions, is not likely to stem the tide of legal developments.
In that decision, which will be discussed later in this article, the
Supreme Court reached its holding that scienter is required under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by strict interpretation of the statutory language and legislative history of the Securities Acts. There
is no doubt that this decision greatly reduces the vulnerability of all
classes of defendants, although some questions were left unanswered. Still to be resolved, for example, is the effect of the case on
certain other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which are increasingly the bases for actions. It may be significant that one of the cases
cited by the Court was Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,7 which
drew a distinction between Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and the proxy
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

McMullen, Committees of the Board of Directors, 29 Bus. LAW. 755, 757 (1974).
Mace, Legal Guidelines for Directors, 53 HARV. Bus. REv. 18 (Sept.-Oct. 1975).
96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
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provisions and held that scienter was not necessarily a requisite to
establishing liability under the latter. As the sources of liability are
expanded in other areas subject to federal regulation, 8 it is not difficult to envision that the SEC will require that an increasing variety
of information be reported in transactions where the standard of
liability is clearly less than scienter.
Any analysis of officer and director liability must begin with a
firm grasp of the fact that there is not one force for change in motion, but two. The first is the developing law; the second is the
changing conceptualization of the role and function of the board of
directors as an entity and directors as individual participants. There
have been changes in board structure and director behavior in response to the higher standards of conduct imposed by the law. But
the changes have by no means been exclusively predicated upon
legal stimuli, since the role and function of boards and directors had
been issues in the business world well before the upsurge of 10b-5
litigation in the mid-sixties. One issue of long-standing concerns
itself with the proper scope of authority to be exercised by professional managers, i.e., insiders.' However, the basic issue in determining liability is the extent to which the board should involve itself
in setting specific policies and objectives and in monitoring their
implementation. To those not well versed in the dynamics of business operations and decision-making, let it be said that this is a
most difficult question to answer. It is easy to criticize the general
treatment by state corporation laws of the management function.
But the fact is that the line separating the board of directors from
the firm's professional managers in terms of the depth and specificity of their involvement in corporate affairs is extremely difficult to
establish in light of the realities of business decision-making in a
dynamic setting.'0 Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that courts create real dilemmas when they extend the reach
of the statutes into corporate affairs.
A realistic and systematic approach to developing director
standards of conduct must start by focusing on judicial interpreta8. Cf. Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1975).
9. In 1960, Ernest Dale, a management expert, articulated this issue in a discerning
article appropriately entitled Management Must Be Made Accountable, 38 HAiv. Bus. REv.
49 (Mar.-Apr. 1960).
10. There has been an abundance of literature describing in general terms what the
proper role and function of the director should be. See, e.g., S. VANCE, THE CORPORATE
DmECTORS (1968); Nolan, Today's Director, 20 N.Y.L.F. 313 (1974); Miller, Fiduciary Duties
of a CorporateDirector,4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975). But, as Mace pointed out in a definitive
study a few years ago, the degree of involvement by directors in decision and policy matters
was more often than not quite perfunctory. M. MACE, DIREcTORs: MYTH AND REALrrY 68 (1971).
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tion of certain liability provisions of the Securities Acts. Some violations of the securities laws present no problem. For example, an
intentionally misleading statement or an omission of obvious significance to the investor leaves no room for debate, especially when
coupled with self-dealing.
Short of this, questions of director action or inaction are subject
to different evaluations and assumptions. What is a reasonable inquiry under a specific set of circumstances? What action or behavior
does "investigation" connote? What kinds of corporate developments may be found to be material? To what extent should an
outside director be cognizant of various areas of corporate operations? Decisions on questions of this type should be made in relation
to reference points which must be derived from a concept of what
should be expected of a director. Herein lies the problem-the role
of the director has been ill-defined, both legally and managerially.
To compound this problem, courts have attempted to apply the
concept of negligence in areas of ordinary business decision-making.
As will be demonstrated later, interpretation and application of the
securities laws has injected the courts into the realm of business
judgment.
Simultaneous attempts are being made along legal and managerial lines to more precisely define the role and standards of the
director. What is needed, however, is a more integrated approach.
It is this writer's view that analysis of the problem can be facilitated by constructing a framework to relate the developing legal
standards of conduct more precisely to the role of the director. To
that end, two analyses will be undertaken. Section II is a functional
analysis of director standards of conduct as they are developing
under-certain provisions of the securities laws. In order to relate the
legal standards in a more practical manner to the director's managerial role, a framework composed of categories of functions appears
to be a useful approach.
Section III contains a projection of the dimensions of a hypothetical director's role from fact situations of four leading cases. One
of the problems of evaluating a director's behavior in the litigative
setting is that it is necessarily an exercise in hindsight. Furthermore, the focus is on the director's specific action or inaction in
relation to a limited scope of transactions. For reasons that will
become apparent later, this poses many problems in determining
the required standard of conduct under specific circumstances. To
develop some perspective on this problem, this writer has examined
the defendant-director's legally-determined standards of conduct in
these four cases and has attempted to relate them to the director
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss2/3
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role in terms of this question: What must the director have done in
the normal course of his duties to meet the standard imposed by the
court?
The objective of these two analyses is to develop some insights
and tentative conclusions bearing on the relationship between legal
standards of conduct and the director's managerial role. The scope
and limitations of these analyses should be noted: The standards of
conduct are discussed in relation to the securities laws and only
certain of its provisions. These provisions tend to relate directly to
directorial duties, encompass a very wide range of directors' responsibilities, and focus on areas in which there has been sufficient
litigation to establish discernible trends. The analyses, for the most
part, are predicated on private civil actions.
II.

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DIRECTOR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

A logical basis for categorizing the corporate director's legal
responsibilities is information. The essence of the Securities Act of
1933," the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,12 and the rules
promulgated thereunder is the disclosure of information. Judicial
action has been responsible in part for the rising incidence of director liability. The SEC, by rapidly expanding the boundaries of corporate disclosure, has also increased director liability. The result
has been a state aptly termed by two commentators as a "continuing flow of information" disclosure requirement.'" The director's
legal responsibilities with respect to this information flow would
seem to fall into four functions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

duty to acquire information.
duty to evaluate information.
duty to transmit information.
duty to act on information.
In analyzing director standards of conduct according to these duties,
attention will be focused on Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act;' 4
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
12. Id.
13. Flom & Atkins, The Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, 52 HARV. Bus. REv.
109 (July-Aug. 1974).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970). The due diligence test of the Act reads in part as follows:
. . .as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on
the authority of an expert . . . he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; and (B) as regards any part of the registration statement
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Rule 10b-5,' 5 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
and Exchange Act;' 6 and Rule 14a-9,' 7 promulgated under Section
14 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.'" These three sections
have had particular impact relative to the directorial role.
purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert. . . (i) he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. . . . [Emphasis added.]
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not miselading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) reads in part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection
with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities exchange,
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975). The rule reads as follows:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to. correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting material
has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be deemed a finding by
the Commission that such material is accurate or complete or not false or misleading,
or that the Commission has passed upon the merits of or approved any statement
contained therein or any matter to be acted upon by security holders. No representation contrary to the foregoing shall be made.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
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Director Responsibilities
The Duty to Acquire Information

The director's duty to acquire or to make reasonable efforts to
acquire information underlies many actions. 9 Whether speaking in
terms of failure to make reasonable investigation, negligence, or
unduly relying upon the word of others, the cases impose upon the
director the responsibility of keeping himself informed of relevant
corporate affairs.
Escott v. BarChrisConstruction Corp.2 0 has been and
still is the
point of reference for Section 11 actions because of its comprehensive discussion and application of the due diligence standards. The
BarChrisaction resulted from an issue of convertible debentures for
which the registration statement was found to contain material false
statements and material omissions. The result of these statements
and omissions was an overly optimistic picture of BarChris' existing
financial condition as well as its future prospects in the bowling
alley construction business. For purposes of this article, discussion
will be confined to the corporation's four outside directors, all of
whom, the court found, had failed to meet the required standards
of reasonable investigation.
Under plaintiff's theory, liability of the four outside directors
was not specifically premised upon their actual knowledge of the
omissions and misstatements contained within the prospectus . 2
Consequently, their defenses were based on the language of Section
11: (1) absence of reasonable grounds to believe and lack of belief
that there were any untrue statements or material omissions as to
the expertised parts of the registration statement, and (2) reasonable investigation resulting in reasonable grounds to believe and actual belief that the registration statement was true and contained
no material omission as to the other parts.
Prior to applying the appropriate standards of conduct, the
court conducted a notably in-depth inquiry into such areas as the
defendants' backgrounds, longevity on the board, expertness, and
access to information. Based on such inquiry, two outside directors
were held to a comparatively lower standard of conduct.2 The other
two outside directors were found to have made an insufficient inves19. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
21. Id. at 687-97.
22. Id. at 688-89.
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tigation, especially in light of their expertness relative to certain
aspects of the registration statement and their participation in activities directly and indirectly related to the misstatements and
omissions.13 In essence, the court held that the latter two directors
had a duty to pursue certain matters in more detail and were not
justified in relying to the degree they did upon company officers in
certain instances. Because of the court's extensive examination of
the degree of director investigation necessary, BarChris must be
considered a landmark case in the field of director liability. The case
also resulted in a notably systematic application of Section 11 standards of due diligence.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.24 is another
significant Section 11 decision. Feit is important for the nature of
the information involved when considering a director's duty to acquire information. The registration statement in Feit was prepared
pursuant to an offer for the exchange of shares issued by Feit for
stock of the Reliance Insurance Company. The issue in the case was
the omission from the registration statement of certain financial
information concerning the target insurance company. The financial information had been omitted because it was based on estimates which varied widely and which the defendants argued were
too unreliable to be included in the registration statement. The
court nevertheless held three directors liable based entirely on this
omission 2 5
The duty to acquire information has been the essence of the
controversy over the standard required in Rule 10b-5 actions, which
controversy has now largely been settled by the Supreme Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.26 If the standard to be applied were
negligence, it would be possible to find a director liable simply for
failure to apprise himself of corporate information and data. The
Court in Ernst & Ernst, however, held that scienter was the standard, and intentional deceit or fraud was required to find liability.
Ernst & Ernst involved fraud on the part of the president and
chief stockholder of a small brokerage firm. The plaintiffs were customers who invested in "escrow" accounts which were in fact nonexistent. The scheme operated for a number of years until 1968
when the president committed suicide, leaving behind a note explaining the scheme. The president had concealed the fraud by use
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 689-97.
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 588.
96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
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of a "mail rule" whereby only he could open mail addressed to him
or to his attention at the firm. The plaintiffs contended that if Ernst
& Ernst had used proper audit procedures, it would have discovered
the "mail rule" and would have conducted an investigation. The
plaintiffs, however, specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or
intentional misconduct by Ernst & Ernst. The court held that the
statutory language and legislative history clearly indicated that
Section 10(b) was addressed to practices that involved some element of scienter and could not be read to impose liability for negligent conduct.
The Court's decision in one broad sweep appears to have ended
the scienter versus negligence controversy. By basing its decision
exclusively on the language and legislative history of the statute, the
Court's holding apparently embraces all classes of defendants. Yet,
as the Court itself acknowledged, some questions are left unanswered, largely because the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed the
existence of fraud or intentional misconduct by Ernst & Ernst. The
Court refrained from addressing the questions of (1) whether in
some circumstances, reckless behavior may be sufficient to impose
liability for some act; (2) whether scienter is a necessary element in
an action for injunctive relief under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5;
and (3) whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 or the elements necessary to
establish such a cause of action."
Thus, unless there are further developments, the director's duty
to acquire information under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 now
appears greatly reduced, at least in terms of civil liability. The
possibility that a reckless behavior standard might impose some
duty to acquire information, particularly where the director is already cognizant of related information, must await further developments.
Director liability based upon the proxy provisions in Rule 14a9 is a relatively recent development. The prospects for increased
reliance upon this rule in litigation, however, seem high in view of
the corporate transactions that potentially could be covered. A leading case is Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.,28 which
involved some misstatements and omissions in a proxy statement
regarding a merger of McLean Industries, Incorporated into R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company. 9 Of the ten director defendants, four
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1380-81 nn. 7, 12.
331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971).
See p. 42 infra.
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were held liable on the basis of their active roles in the activities
which the court found resulted in the misstatements and omissions.
The court determined that the record did not adequately disclose a
sufficient basis for holding the remaining six directors liable in summary judgment. While the court said that it was not willing to rule
that scienter was irrelevant in a suit for personal liability against
individual directors, it implied that the six directors might have
3°
had a duty to investigate.
Other Rule 14a-9 decisions have explicitly found a duty to investigate. Although the court in Norte v. Huffiness"' found that the
defendant officers and directors had knowledge, it stated that actual
knowledge was not essential. In Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Committee,3 2 outside director-nominees in a
proxy solicitation contest were held to have a duty to examine the
proxy statement and to correct statements of fact which they knew
or should have known were erroneous or misleading. 33 Thus, the
court indicated a standard of negligence rather than scienter.
In summation, the director's duty to acquire information or
make a reasonable effort to do so is quite extensive, even considering
the now-established scienter standard in Rule 10b-5 actions. The
impressive fact is the wide range of corporate affairs and transactions to which this duty may apply.
2.

The Duty to Evaluate Information

While the standards of conduct of directors and officers have
typically been expressed in terms of due diligence, standard of care,
reasonable investigation, and justifiable reliance on sources of information, the concept of a duty to evaluate information has not been
readily used, if it has been used at all. Undoubtedly it is well recognized that information evaluation is inherent in the process of meeting those standards of conduct expressed in other terms. It is suggested, however, that the duty to evaluate information is sufficiently emergent to consider its recognition as an identifiable element of legal responsibility in the realm of director and officer liabilities. It should be noted that a court's implicit recognition of the
duty to evaluate encroaches on areas of substantive business decisions, the business judgment doctrine notwithstanding. Neverthe30. 331 F. Supp. at 998-99.
31. 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), 288 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (supplemental
opinion), af'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
32. 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973).
33. Id. at 915-16.
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less, in light of the actualities of director liability, as a unit of
analysis, the duty to evaluate would seem to serve a useful purpose.
Courts often have implicitly imposed the duty to evaluate when
they have found directors liable. For example, a finding of liability
is usually premised upon the materiality of information which is
often presumed. While the definition and meaning of materiality in
the federal statutes may be difficult to establish precisely,3 4 the
impact of materiality on director liability is not. Consider, for example, that the conscious withholding of information judged by officers
and directors to be non-essential may subsequently be determined
to be material. And it is not difficult to envision the failure to
correct an after-discovered error in a communication that has been
distributed simply because it is judged insignificant. Legal consequences could follow based upon that faulty evaluation.
The due diligence standard of Section 11, it should be remembered, is composed of two elements. The first is reasonable investigation. The second is a determination that there are reasonable
grounds to believe in the truth of statements made or in the absence
of material omissions, and actual belief in the same. The reasonable
grounds to believe element imposes a duty to evaluate information.
While a duty to evaluate information is not usually discernible
as such from the language of a court's opinion, close scrutiny will
frequently show that culpability often is based, at least in part, on
just that. Thus, in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 35 the
liability of the attorney-director and the investment banker-director
would seem to have been premised in part on faulty evaluation of
the information available. The court stated that the attorney, for
example, did prepare the registration statement, and he did look at
certain documents and data. The court's holding that he should
have probed further is a reflection on his evaluation of the information available to him.3 Likewise, the court pointed out that the
investment banker had obtained some information which put him
on notice of problems within the company and as a result, he had
taken corrective action on the problems. 37 The inference is that his
information should have prompted him to further inquiry.
Some decisions reveal more directly that the defendant's inadequate evaluation of information was central to the finding of liabil34. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
35. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
36. Id. at 687.
37. Id. at 697.

Published by eCommons, 1976

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:2

ity. In Berman v. Thompson," an action based on insufficient description in a proxy statement of certain assets of the corporation,
directors were held liable, despite defenses of good faith, honest
business judgment, and protection of corporate opportunity. The
directors contended that the failure to disclose was in the best interests of the company. The decision, in effect, faulted that judgment.
Feit v. Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.3" is worth further examination in the context of a duty to evaluate information.
It will be recalled that the essential omission in Leasco's registration
statement involved the estimate of one aspect of the financial condition of the target company, the Reliance Insurance Company. The
defendant directors contended most strenuously that an accurate
estimation could not have been made because it necessitated information gathered from outside sources. The court's decision, in
essence, was based upon the defendants' failure to evaluate the
usefulness of the data available and the prospects for acquiring
further information.
Whether the concept of a duty to evaluate information is viable
as a legal principle or not, it seems almost imperative for the director and perhaps his counsel to analyze it carefully. It would appear
reasonable that where legal liability is based largely on the flow of
information, evaluation of information will be the source of much
potential culpability. Systematic analysis should reveal those business events in which the evaluation of information will be vital to
minimize legal culpability.
3.

The Duty to Transmit Information

The duty to transmit information is central and primary in the
regulatory scheme. The central issues in most of the reported 10b-5
litigation are the transmission of misleading information or the
failure to transmit material information. A classic early example
concerned the failure of two directors who had purchased shares of
stock from certain uninformed shareholders to disclose the central
fact that a third party had agreed to purchase all the corporation's
assets.4 0 Most recently, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst emphasized that material information must be transmitted if the directors
are to avoid culpability.
Rule 10b-5 is the primary means for the regulation of information transmitted to investors after the registration and proxy state38.
39.
40.

312 F.Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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ments have been issued. However, Section 11 and Rule 14a-9 impose
certain duties upon directors in connection with the transmission of
information, as opposed to the acquisition and the evaluation of
such information.
Accordingly, in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Independent
Stockholders Committee,4 ' the director-nominees were held liable
for failing to read the proxy statement, the assumption being that
they should have corrected statements of fact which they knew or
should have known were erroneous. The clear inference of Escott v.
BarChris Construction Corp.4" is that both the attorney-director and
the investment banker-director had a duty not only to ascertain
information but also to take positive action to correct the information in the registration statement and the prospectus. In the BarChris prospectus gross sales of a substantial dollar amount were
included for which no enforceable contracts actually existed. The
court implied that the attorney-director should have discovered this
and initiated action to correct the financial data in the prospectus. 3
The court also indicated clearly that the investment banker had
uncovered sufficient information about the inaccuracy of periodic
sales estimates to impose upon himself a duty to follow through on
corrective action to the extent of seeing that financial data in the
prospectus was verified before finalization."
The logical point of reference for an examination of the duty of
transmitting information under Rule 10b-5 is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.45 The fulcrum of the
events in Texas Gulf Sulphur and the private actions that followed"
were two company press releases: the first downgrading the status
and prospects of a drilling for ore in Ontario and the second, issued
a few days later, announcing a substantial discovery of ore deposits.
Test drillings made several months prior to either press release had
yield favorable results, a fact known by a number of insiders,
including officers, directors, employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur and
persons alerted by them, i.e., "tippees," who bought stock or calls
on the stock. The court found the information material47 and held
that the insiders had violated Rule 10b-5. The first press release,
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
1972).
47.

354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973).
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Id. at 686-87.
Id. at 697.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation, 344 F. Supp. 1398 (S.D.N.Y.
401 F.2d at 848-53.
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furthermore, was found materially misleading, which was the basis
for liability in the private actions.4 8
Texas Gulf Sulphur illustrates several facets of the legal responsibility of insiders, including directors, in information
transmission. In that case "insider" was broadly defined as anyone
possessing material inside information.49 Such persons must either
disclose the information to the investing public or abstain from
trading in the securities concerned while the information remains
undisclosed. Furthermore, trading by the insider himself is not required to impose liability. Conveying inside information to others
who do trade is a sufficient link for the "in connection with" element
of the rule1" Information may be considered material whenever its
substance would influence an investor, perhaps even a speculative
one. Finally, the mode of transmission of the misleading information may take many forms, including a press release.
There are several benchmarks of which the director and others
governed by 10b-5 must be aware. The director, inside or outside,
may at some point attain the status of insider as to information. A
wide range of company developments may at some point become
legally material. The determination of materiality is a matter of
prejudging the mental response of a hypothetical investor. Information transmitted, especially when it involves the characterization of
business prospects, may be subject to an after-the-fact evaluation
which will narrow the acceptable zone between over-optimism and
under-pessimism. The point of "release" for legitimate trading on
one's own account must be preceded by effective communication to
the investing public. "Tipping" prior to public disclosure may lead
to liability.
The remaining consideration is who the potential plaintiff may
be. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.' established that only purchasers or sellers of the securities in question have standing under
Rule 10b-5. The "Birnbaum Doctrine" was recently affirmed by the
2
alSupreme Court in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps,1
though some gray areas still surround the definition of purchaser
and seller.
4.

The Duty to Act on Information

There is a distinction between the duty to act upon information
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 8 52-53.
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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and the transmission of information as discussed in the previous
section. Essentially, the duty to act refers to action within the corporation. The fact that duty exists at all demonstrates the impact
of the federal securities laws on all aspects of corporate affairs.
Although the action contemplated to comply with this duty is internal, it derives ultimately from the normal course of compliance with
SEC requirements.
Some of the incidences of impact on internal corporate affairs
have already been alluded to. Thus, in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,5 the court inferred a duty of active participation in
internal matters on the part of two of the directors. In Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp.," the court clearly imposed a
duty upon management relative to an internal operation, i.e., the
calculation of a financial entry reflective of the financial condition
of the target company. The required action in Feit involved not only
the use of available data but also the acquisition of additional information external to Leasco itself.
In Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.5 5 the court
made provocative comments regarding the potential duties to act of
the six directors not held liable, but whose possible culpability remained in question. There, four directors who were held liable were
identified as the "involved directors" not only because they were
active participants in the merger negotiations, but also because
three of them represented corporate shareholders of McLean, a company which had an interest in the transaction. The conflicting obligations of the "involved directors" were essential considerations in
the court's finding of liability."
Commenting on the potential duties of the six "non-involved"
directors, the court made the interesting observation that in view
of their knowledge of the potential conflicts of interest of the other
directors due to their company affiliation, the "non-involved" directors may very well have had a duty to exercise a kind of policing
function with respect to the entire merger transaction. The court
implied that those directors who were not directly involved in this
transaction by virtue of participation by their own corporations
were, perhaps, in a position to perform a policing function in relation to the merger.5 7 In a sense this reflects no more than what has
been indicated earlier as a growing trend: the use of committees
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971).
Id. at 998.
Id. at 999.
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composed entirely of outside directors in such areas as auditing and
executive compensation.
Perhaps one of the most far-reaching participations of any court
in internal corporate affairs can be found in SEC v. Mattel, Inc. 8
There a consent decree was issued which, among other things, ordered Mattel within sixty days (1) to appoint two new outside directors satisfactory to the Commission and approved by the court; (2)
to establish a financial controls and audit committee consisting of
four directors satisfactory to the Commission and approved by the
court, with detailed instructions of duties; and (3) to establish a
litigation and claims committee of three directors, satisfactory to
the commission and approved by the court, again detailing their
duties and responsibilities.5 9
B.

Perspective on the FunctionalAnalysis

The picture that emerges from this functional analysis of director standards of conduct is, not surprisingly, one of constantly expanding areas of responsibilities with seemingly indefinite boundaries. Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is merit in amplifying
and further developing this model. While this analysis will not serve
as an encyclopedia of director liabilities for quick and easy reference, and is not intended as such, the explanation of the legal responsibilities of the director by reference to a "duties" framework
may help relate those responsibilities to the director's total managerial role. It seems obvious that the typical director does not think
in terms of statutory sections when he tries to understand the law
relating to his corporate function. What makes more sense to him
is the translation of his legal responsibilities into functions that can
be integrated with all other managerial functions. This translation
of law into pragmatic behavior may not protect a director against
all possible litigation, but hopefully it may establish a base for
better performance of legal responsibilities as part of the execution
of a managerial role.
While this functional approach helps to recognize the picture
of director liabilities in a manner that can be related to their management roles, what is needed additionally is clear guidance by
the courts in their discussion of the legal standards of conduct
which will actually be demanded of directors in the normal course
of performance of their duties.
58.

Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Mettel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974).
Id. at 96,693-95.

FED. SEC. L. REP.

59.
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III.

PROJECTING DIMENSIONS OF THE DIRECTOR'S ROLE

The major premise of this article is that there is a vital need to
relate the developing legal responsibilities of the corporate director
to a more descriptive definition of his role in managerial terms. It
should be kept in mind that a court in examining a director's behavior is scrutinizing specific acts or omissions in the context of a particular transaction, such as a merger, a stock issue, or a purchase
of securities. In retrospect, the courts have generally recognized the
necessity for evaluating legal responsibility in light of the broader
dimensions of the director's over-all role. The difficulty in relating
the two factors has been the lack of role definition that is both
sufficiently descriptive and broadly applicable.
Director culpability, in its simplest terms, is based upon what
a director did or failed to do. To a large extent, a director's acts or
omissions involve information regarding corporate affairs of all
sorts: failure to investigate in order to acquire information, failure
to evaluate the materiality of information, and failure to transmit
information. In order to relate these potential legal liabilities to the
broader aspects of the director's role, one need simply ask: What
must a director, in the course of his normal role and function, have
done in order to have acquired, evaluated, transmitted or acted on
information? Accordingly, this question will be used as a basis both
for discussing how a hypothetical director should have performed
his role and function" and for analyzing four leading cases: Escott
v. BarChris Construction Corp.,"' Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,6" Feit v.
Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.,6 3 and Gould v. American
Hawaiian Steamship Co."
In view of the Ernst & Ernst decision, a comment is in order
regarding the inclusion of Lanza v. Drexel & Co.6 5 The Lanza decision, which found the defendant-director not liable, required a
scienter standard; however, commentators have questioned the
court's strict application of this standard. The Lanza court also
60. In doing this, some license is taken occasionally by assuming liability beyond what
the cases analyzed actually held. This is not only justified but realistic in view of the fact
that in these classes of fact situations liability has been found in other proceedings.
61. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
63. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
64. 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971), 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), later proceeding,
362 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del. 1973), 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (supplemental opinion).
65. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
66. See, e.g., Ruder, FactorsDetermining the Degree of CulpabilityNecessary for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 571 (1975).

Published by eCommons, 1976

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:2

implied that the director might have behaved recklessly in this fact
situation and if so, this behavior might be sufficient to satisfy the
scienter standard. The transactions involved in Lanza present a
situation similar to that which is often the basis of an action under
other sections of the securities laws in which a standard less than
scienter has been applied. Regardless of the result, the Lanza decision included a relatively full account of the actions and behavior
of the defendant, permitting a useful analysis for purposes here.
A.

Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.

The well-known and often-cited BarChrisdecision provides an
exemplary point of departure for this analysis. The action, brought
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, is still the most
complete, and therefore the most important, discussion of director
and officer liability. The case involved both inside and outside
directors, company officers, outside accounting firm, and underwriters. It delineated standards of care and diligence according to
the status of the defendants, their involvement in the transactions,
and the substance of the registration statement and prospectus.
The court found liability among all categories of defendants.
The BarChris action centered on a debenture issue in 1961.
BarChris Construction Corporation was a fast-growing firm primarily in the business of constructing bowling alleys. As is typical in
rapidly growing firms, capital needs became critical for BarChris,
and the debenture issue was one of several attempts to alleviate the
situation. 7 The company's financial problems culminated in its filing under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act 8 in October of 1962,
when default on interest due to the debentures was imminent.
BarChris' financial difficulties were reflected in the use of some
unusual policies and practices in accounting procedures with respect to classification of accounts and valuation of assets. Its cash
needs compelled heavy factoring of its accounts receivable with
stringent obligations to repurchase in case of customer default. All
of these factors naturally affected the validity of bottom line figures.
These financial and accounting practices were, to a large measure,
the source of what the court found to be material misstatements and
omissions in the registration statement and prospectus. Purchasers
of the convertible debentures, who ultimately numbered over sixty
67. Other attempts made to supply needed capital included a December, 1959, issuance
of 560,000 shares of common stock at $3 per share and an aborted May, 1962, attempt to
sell more common stock.
68. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
69. 283 F. Supp. at 681.
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at the time of trial, brought action against three categories of defendants: the signers of the registration statement, eight underwriters
led by Drexel & Co., and the auditing firm of Peat, Marwick &
Mitchell. The signers included BarChris Construction Corporation,
nine directors and the company controller, who was not a director.
Of the directors, five were officers of the company, i.e., "insiders,"
and four were outside directors. The outside directors are the focus
of attention here.
The court recognized that varying standards of diligence should
be imposed on the four outside directors according to their status
and circumstances. 0 Two of the directors (Auslander and Rose),
upon whom a lesser standard of diligence was placed, were found
liable for failure to investigate the accuracy of the registration statement. In addition, these defendants were found to have placed
undue reliance in the audited portions of the financial statements
and in the general assurances of company officers that the registration statement was accurate. Since the court found that Auslander
and Rose undertook virtually no investigation, it did not analyze the
standard of due diligence to which they were to be held.7 ' The third
outside director, a young attorney from the firm representing BarChris, had been a director for only a short period of time. Although
he had made some inquiries into the accuracy -of the registration
statement, the court concluded those inquiries did not constitute
the reasonable investigation necessary to meet the higher standard
of diligence required of a person with his background and training.7 2
The fourth outside director was Bertram D. Coleman, an investment banker who represented the interests of his firm, Drexel &
Company, on the BarChris board. (Coleman subsequently became
the major subject of Lanza v. Drexel & Co., a case based on Drexel
& Co.'s underwriting of the BarChris security issuance.) Prior to
becoming a director, Coleman made an investigation of BarChris to
determine whether Drexel & Company should participate in underwriting the BarChris debentures. Moreover, he personally attended
meetings in which the BarChris prospectus was discussed and revised. Subsequent to his becoming a director, however, the court
found that Coleman made no further investigation and relied unjustifiably upon his counsel for verification of information and data.
The court held Coleman to a standard of due diligence equivalent
to that of an underwriter.73
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 687-97.
Id. at 687-89.
Id. at 689-92.
Id. at 692-97.
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Although there were material misstatements or omissions in the
1960 BarChris balance sheet, the court found the most serious violations in the financial statements for the 1961 fiscal year of April 30:11
1. Sales and gross profits. Sales and gross profits for the first
quarter of 1961 were overstated by over $500,000. Further, by the
court's estimation, backlog orders were overstated by approximately
$4.5 million; this amount included orders for which no legally enforceable contracts existed.7 5
2. Loans to officers. The prospectus included misstatements
as to effective dates of substantial loans made to several of the
company's officers. As of its effective date, the prospectus incorrectly stated that the loans had been repaid. Furthermore, there had
been additional loans which had not been disclosed.
3. Repurchase of discounted customer notes. BarChris regularly discounted customer notes through a factor.76 The agreement
with the factor obligated BarChris to repurchase in case of default.
Although the prospectus stated that since 1955 BarChris had been
required to repurchase less than one-half of one percent of such
notes, as of the effective date of the prospectus, May 16, 1961, the
evidence indicated that BarChris would likely have to repurchase a
substantially larger percentage of its discounted notes in view of the
tenuous financial condition of many of its customers.
4. Lines of business indicated. The prospectus failed to mention that BarChris was currently operating several bowling alleys
and that it was likely that it would be operating several more because the prospects of selling newly built alleys were not good.
5. Application of debenture issue proceeds. The prospectus
incorrectly stated that the proceeds of the issue were to be used for
financing business expansion. In fact, a substantial part of the proceeds were applied to existing debts.
Director Role
The purpose of the following commentary is to analyze the
74. Id. at 689-82.
75. Id. at 680. In question were contracts for six bowling alleys, five of which had been
built already. These were ostensibly built by one Tumminello. Not only were the contracts
invalid, but the agreement with Tumminello included contingencies predicating prospects
upon highly tenuous plans for the future organization and financing of a corporation. The
outlook for active culmination of a sale was very questionable.
76. A factor is defined as "A commercial agent, employed by a principal to sell merchandise consigned to him for that purpose, for and in behalf of the principal, but usually in
his own name, being intrusted with the prossession and control of the goods, and being
renumerated by a commission, commonly called 'factorage.'" BLACK'S LAW DXcIONAaR 707
(4th ed. 1968).
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degree and type of involvement a theoretical director would have
had to maintain in relation to the particular types of misstatements
and omissions noted above in order to avoid actual or potential
liability.
The violative misstatements and omissions in BarChris dealt
largely with financial matters. As an overall observation, knowledge
of the discrepancies would have required director involvement in
corporate affairs far beyond examination of typical financial reports
and data. While a director could have asked specific questions about
financial categories, realistically it is questionable how much his
inquiries would reveal unless the source of information, e.g., one of
the officers, had volunteered a further breakdown of the figures.
Nevertheless, in some areas moderate probing should have produced some revealing results. For example, it would be logical to
inquire into the terms of the factoring agreement in view of the
heavy use of this financing method. Had such inquiry been made,
the repurchase obligation should have come readily to light. Furthermore, prudence would dictate inquiry into the financial condition of customers whose notes were discounted.
There are other areas into which a director reasonably could
have been expected to inquire. The officers' loans is one such area
in view of the substantial amounts that were loaned by a company
the size of BarChris. Another area is the large backlog of orders.
Prudent businessmen are typically concerned with how "solid" the
backlog is and how much "slippage" should be expected.
The difficulty in unearthing the true facts in these areas arises
because the director normally relies on outside auditors for compilation and verification of the company's current status and therefore
does not learn what lies behind the auditor's figures. Moreover, the
familiarity with internal operations necessary to uncover such matters as invalid sales contracts, recent entry into different lines of.
business, and improper inclusion of temporary funds in current assets would seem to lie beyond the typical directors' flow of information."
How, then, may the typical director keep abreast of this information and other developments? Much, of course, depends upon the
range and depth of business considered at board meetings. But beyond this, experience points to several means:
First, intensive study of historical accounting and financial
data is essential to the director's orientation. Changes in patterns
77.

H. KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT (1967).
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in the financial statements and reports reflect important developments and often indicate areas where attention should be concentrated. Second, personal rapport and frequent interchanges with
key executives is a fertile source of information "feel" for what is
happening in specific areas of operations. Third, familiarity with
the industry and acquaintances with the company's customers and
suppliers provides information insights that add important dimensions to the director's perspective of the company. Finally, what
may be termed "random cues" often suggest avenues of inquiry,
e.g., substantial errors in estimating or projecting sales and profits,
large unexpected write-offs, major organizational shake-ups, etc.
The courts have also pointed to a varied assortment of such cues
which should have alerted a defendant to the need for further inquiry.
The picture which emerges, therefore, is one of director involvement far exceeding mere attendance at board meetings.
B.

Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
Lanza is a sequal to BarChris involving as it does the acquisition by the BarChris Construction Corporation of the Victor Billiard Company. The particular transaction that spawned this Rule
10b-5 action was an exchange of Victor stock owned by Frank Lanza
and two of his relatives for BarChris stock. At trial, several BarChris director-officers were found liable under Rule 10b-5, common
law fraud and, in the case of two of them, Section 20(a) of the 1934
Act."8
The issue on appeal in Lanza was whether Bertram D. Coleman
was personally liable under Rule 10b-5 in connection with the exchange of stock. It will be recalled that Coleman, along with others,
had been found liable under Section 11 of the 1933 Act in the
BarChriscase. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found Coleman
not liable because of his lack of scienter which the court held was
the required standard in a 10b-5 action."
The misrepresentations and deceptions that were the basis for
the action in Lanza were communicated to the plaintiffshareholders and their representative, an accountant upon whom
the plaintiffs relied heavily, by certain BarChris officers in a series
of meetings and written communications. The misrepresentations
involved concerned BarChris' condition and situation as described
in BarChris. Plaintiffs' argument as to Coleman's liability was
78.
79.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
479 F.2d at 1287-89.
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premised on a duty owed by him to the plaintiffs in connection with
the stock exchange. The court spoke of Coleman's duty to "convey"
proper and valid information to the plaintiffs."0 Coleman, however,
must have had knowledge before his duty to convey would arise.
Presumably in this case Coleman's knowledge should have consisted
of two factors. First, Coleman needed to know of the inaccuracies
regarding BarChris' true condition and situation. Second, he needed
to know what was being transmitted to the plaintiffs. The pertinent
events can be summarized as follows:
1. Between March, 1961, and December 14, 1961, at which
time the exchange of stock took place, at least four meetings were
held between certain BarChris officers and Lanza and/or his accountant. Coleman was not present at any of these meetings during
which the main negotiations took place; nor was he present at the
BarChris board meeting on November 6 at which time the exchange
was approved and a resolution authorizing the exchange contract
passed. Coleman first learned of the proposed merger about November 13 through the minutes of the board meeting which were mailed
to him. Coleman was present at the board meeting of November 21,
at which time the contract was approved.
2. Coleman learned through a newspaper account that the
company's published earnings for the first six months of 1961 had
been revised. He called for an explanation and was apprised of the
fact that deficient documentation had resulted or might result in
BarChris becoming an unsecured creditor with a major customer
account. Coleman demanded and received assurances that action
would be taken to correct any current or future deficiencies in documentation.
3. Coleman learned that misleading information had been
disseminated regarding the company's diversification and earnings
prospects; and he, along with one other director, initiated a policy
which would prevent future disclosure of information without prior
approval by company counsel.
4. Coleman was present at a special board meeting on December 6, referred as the "point of crisis" meeting, in which very serious
inter-management strife was revealed and charges were made by
one segment of management regarding some of the highly questionable practices recounted in the BarChrisdecision. Coleman assessed
the situation as serious but concluded that it involved an internal
power conflict within management. He inquired about some of the
revelations disclosed at the meeting. His inquiries were directed
80.

Id. at 1289.
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mostly to the company treasurer in whom Coleman had great confidence and whose general assurances were apparently satisfactory.
His action consisted of recommending the engagement of an outside
consultant which was done within a few days.
Director Role
The role and function of a director in this set of circumstances
is more concerned with his action or lack thereof, rather than acquiring information, although the two are naturally inter-related.
Director action would seem to be called for on two counts: first, a
major transaction, the merger, was in process; second, there were
unmistakable signs of serious problems, culminating in the crisis
meeting of December 6. It should be noted that Coleman did initiate
some action in response to clear indications of problems and improper management practices. The question concerns the limited scope
and depth of both the inquiries made and the actions taken. The
situation here points out what may be regarded as a special responsibility of the outside director. Given evidence of internal problems
involving both questionable management practices and interpersonal strife among executives at the very top of the management
structure, special and concerted action by outside directors would
seem reasonable and even necessary in terms of both legal responsibility and good management practices. Connecting the director's
internal responsibility with the Rule 10b-5 standard of conduct may
be a two-step process, i.e., the gathering of information and the
dissemination of information. These crisis indicators point to a duty
to make an in-depth investigation and to take special action, which
in turn may require a thorough analysis of any impending major
acquisition.
C.

Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp."' is another
significant Section 11 decision in which a material omission was
found in a registration statement. The Feit decision is particularly
relevant to the analysis in this article because of the nature of the
information involved and the court's conclusions as to what the
defendants' responsibilities were with respect to that information.
The registration statement and prospectus were prepared pursuant to an offer by the issuer, Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corporation (Leasco), of a "package" of preferred shares and warrants for the common stock of Reliance Insurance Company (Reli81.

332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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ance). Leasco's interest in acquiring control of Reliance was stimulated by a study of fire and casualty insurance companies by the
firm of Carter, Berlind and Weill, culminating in a report by Edward Netter. The "Netter Report" developed a concept which would
modify the corporate structure of the typical fire and casualty comutilization of its resources, especially
pany to facilitate maximum
"surplus surplus.""s Netter estimated Reliance's surplus surplus at
$80,000,000 as of December 31, 1966. Leasco Vice President Michael
Gibbs, using the Netter Report, estimated Reliance's surplus surplus to be $125,000,000 as of June 30, 1967, or $100,000,000 as of the
end of 1967. In addition to these estimates, Leasco had available a
report issued by the New York Insurance Department which discussed the problem and a variety of methods for determining surplus surplus, setting forth some "rules of thumb" for making approximations. 3
Leasco failed to make any mention in the prospectus of the surplus surplus, either the amount or its significance. The prospectus
did contain an implied reference to surplus surplus in its discussion
of the holding company that would be formed into which the surplus
surplus could be transferred in order to free it from regulatory restrictions. The court found the failure to discuss the surplus surplus
estimates a material omission.8
Several aspects of this decision should be noted. The omitted
"fact" was the amount of the surplus surplus. That figure was based
on estimates, not concrete data, and involved the financial condition of Reliance, the target company, rather than the financial condition of the issuer.6 Only with the cooperation of Reliance could
Leasco have improved the accuracy of its estimate of the amount
of the surplus surplus. Reliance's president agreed with Leasco's
chief executive officer that the reliability of the methods used by
both the Netter and Gibbs analyses were dependent upon access to
Reliance's internal data. Access to this internal data was difficult
to obtain in this case due to Reliance's admitted hostility toward
Leasco.5 6
The court nevertheless found the defendants liable for the omis82. "Surplus surplus" is the highly liquid assets of an insurance company which can
be used in non-regulated enterprises. The amount of surplus is very important in insurance
companies since they are not generally permitted to engage in non-insurance business activities.
83. 332 F. Supp. at 550-51.
84. Id. at 575.
85. Id. at 568.
86. Id. at 555.
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sion, concluding from the evidence that information from Reliance
could reasonably have been obtained in spite of Reliance's hostility.
Furthermore, the court suggested that Leasco could have engaged
the services of a consultant to assist in the estimation. Finally, the
court inferred that Leasco could have met its responsibilities by
reporting the estimates they did have. 7
DirectorRole
In analyzing the inferences that can be drawn regarding the
director's role in this situation, the first factor to note is that the
standard of conduct required varies in accordance with the director's status, which often will not be clearly determinable in a legal
sense until the time of litigation. The defendants here included
three directors, all of whom were classified "insiders" by the court
and accordingly were held to a higher standard of due diligence.
There was no question as to the insider status of the two directors
who were executive officers. The third officer, the company's general
counsel, was a member of a law firm. The court nevertheless found
that he had been sufficiently involved in the transactions in question to be classified an "insider." 8 8 The fact that the attorneydirector was found to be an insider indicates that the courts have
not yet established clear-cut guidelines as to who will be considered
insiders. Such guidelines may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine because of the widely varying relationships which nonemployee directors have with their companies.
What must the director in this situation have done to meet the
standard of conduct imposed by the court? At the very least he must
have fulfilled his duties to acquire and evaluate information. Those
duties in the Feit case would have involved the evaluation of the
validity of the surplus surplus estimates and the significance of
those estimates to a potential investor. The potential materiality of
information is often difficult to ascertain in advance. But in Feit
that difficulty was compounded by the possibility that an estimate
of the amount of the surplus surplus might subsequently be found
to be misleading.
In Feit the duty to acquire information was extended to confidential internal information of the target company, or information
rarely available to those outside the target company. Moreover, the
Leasco directors would have had to do considerable "homework"
not only on the fire and casualty insurance industry as a whole but
also on the computation of surplus surplus, a computation very
87.
88.

Id. at 573-74.
Id. at 576.
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difficult and problem-laden even for insurance industry professionals.
D.

Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Company

Gould involved a merger of McLean Industries, Inc., into R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company. Certain McLean stockholders brought
an action under Section 14(a) of the1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 alleging
misstatements and omissions on the proxy statement. There were
three categories of defendants: (1) Reynolds and McLean; (2) ten
McLean directors, all of whom voted to approve the merger; and (3)
a group of corporate shareholders who were alleged to have received
favored treatment under the merger agreement.
The court granted a partial summary judgment and found four
of the directors liable on the basis of their knowledge of the untrue
statements and omissions and their involvement in some aspects of
the negotiations. The court held that the record was insufficient to
hold the remaining six "non-involved" directors liable in summary
judgment. 9
The court suggested, however, that the non-involved directors
may well have had a duty to investigate. Although it did not wish
to establish the appropriate standard of liability applicable to the
non-involved directors, the court stated that it was not suggesting
that by remaining ignorant of corporate affairs, a director may immunize himself from liability under Section 14(a).11 The court made
the interesting observation that if any of the directors would have
been expected to police the solicitation of the proxies and the actions of those directly involved in the negotiations, it would obviously have been the non-involved directors."
The liability of the four "involved" directors was based on the
following material misstatements and omissions:"
1. The failure to disclose the differing treatment of the two
groups of common shareholders under the merger agreement. One
group was to receive a package consisting mainly of Reynolds preferred stock, allegedly worth substantially less than the $50 per
share to be received by the favored group of corporate shareholder
defendants.
2. A statement in the proxy material that five of the major
89. 331 F. Supp. 981, 998-1000 (D. Del. 1971). Subsequent to the decision, there was a
settlement agreed upon by the plaintiffs and these defendants. 387 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Del.
1974).
90. 331 F. Supp. at 999.
91. Id.
92. Id.at 985.
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McLean shareholders, including four of the corporate shareholders,
had agreed to vote for the merger as part of the purchase agreement
with Reynolds. Use of the words "have agreed" were deemed misleading since there was in fact no legally binding agreement.
3. The failure to disclose the fact that two corporate shareholders had veto power over the merger as well as power to control
subsequent financing.
4. Failure to reveal information regarding two potential conflicts of interest. The first involved three of the involved directors
who served not only on the boards of three of the defendant corporations but also on the Reynolds board. The second potential conflict
involved Malcolm McLean, president of McLean Industries, a
member of its board of directors, and a controlling shareholder, who
had negotiated for both the favored group of shareholders and the
remaining shareholders.
DirectorRole
In the above situation, two questions are pertinent to the hypothetical director not involved in the negotiations: How would he
have apprised himself of the above developments? What action
should he properly have taken?
The first question is germane to the whole problem of director
involvement in corporate management. The director in the course
of normal board activities presumably would have available at least
the basic terms of the agreement. However, collateral agreements
and information concerning negotiations would more often than not
be unavailable. These transactions are often quite complex and negotiated under circumstances of confidentiality, and dissemination
of information is therefore restricted, especially during the early
stages."
Realistically, it is difficult to understand how a director can be
held responsible for ascertaining complete information during the
negotiating phase. The negotiating officers are normally under an
obligation to the other party to treat certain matters as confidential,
at least during periods of sensitive negotiations. The director
unquestionably has a duty to inquire and ascertain the essentials of
negotiation developments. However, he could not be faulted for
accepting the fact that some negotiating information must be with93. There are compelling reasons for this. The extent to which a particular director may
be privy to detailed information as to what is going on during the negotiation process depends
either upon his personal rapport with key negotiators or his status as an expert, in which case
he may be drawn into active participation at least in some aspects of the process.
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held. Much depends upon the nature of the companies involved and
the complexity of the transaction. Once the final terms of an agreement are made known, a reasonable standard would impose on the
director a duty to probe into those terms of the agreement which
should raise questions to a prudent businessman. Furthermore, both
key inside officers and outside directors should realize that full disclosure requirements necessitate careful scrutiny of all aspects of
the transaction. Nevertheless, the prudent businessman standard
should permit the director to rely during negotiations upon some of
the information and assurances provided by officers during their
negotiations.
The second question poses a problem of practical importance:
what should the outside directors be expected to do in a situation
similar to that in Gould? Where certain members of the board have
potentially conflicting relationships and obligations, non-involved
directors may have special responsibilities such as "policing" the
negotiations. Some policing mechanisms have been used, e.g., audit
committees composed exclusively of outside directors. The policing
function may create its own problems. For example, because some
negotiations must be kept secret, the non-involved director may
have so little information that he may not be able to ask the kinds
of questions necessary to carry out the policing function. In the final
analysis, acting responsibly is presently a matter of both personal
and corporate integrity in meeting legal and managerial obligations.

IV.

PERSPECTIVE AND SUGGESTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

In relating legal standards of conduct under the federal securities laws to the director's role, the critical areas are the acquisition
and evaluation of information. Director culpability under Rule 10b5, Section 11, and Rule 14a-9 ultimately focuses on the question of
whether the director did know or should have known certain information. The duty to acquire and evaluate information is more indigenous to the director's role than is the duty to transmit information. The duty to act internally on information (as opposed to transmitting information externally) is not sufficiently crystallized to
comment with any specificity. Whatever standards of conduct may
ultimately emerge will be premised on whether the director did
know or should have known about certain facets of corporate affairs.
As for suggestions to management in its pursuit of a more descriptive definition of the director role, this analysis suggests several
guidelines. It is suggested that the functional analysis of director
duties with respect to information is a useful framework to relate
legal responsibilities to directorial duties and roles. The standards
Published by eCommons, 1976
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of conduct can be more readily understood by directors in terms of
duties to acquire, evaluate, transmit, and act on information; but
these duties must be related to specific fact situations. In order to
properly evaluate the potential legal significance of corporate developments on investors, the directors must orient themselves to the
firm's business and the industry in which it operates. Additionally,
directors must be aware of external relationships of board members which would create potential conflicts of interest in specific
transactions.
The more immediate concern, however, is development of the
legal standards of conduct themselves. The writer suggests there is
the need to place some boundaries upon what should realistically
be expected, especially of the outside director, in the realm of information acquisition and evaluation.
While it is not too much to expect a director to be cognizant of
the kinds of transactions that call for careful scrutiny in view of
potential materiality to the investor, the problem is that full information is usually dependant upon apprising directors of corporate
developments regularly and in some depth over a period of time. A
recent SEC special report is indicative of the problem. 4 Commenting on the behavior of two outside directors, which the Commission
found inadequate, the report pointed to (1) the lack of an internal
system of information designed to supply the directors with normal
business information on a regular basis, and (2) the directors' failure
to familiarize themselves with the accounting practices used by the
firm. The report acknowledged that to some extent the directors
recognized this and even reacted by making some inquiry-but in
the Commission's view, not an adequate one. How much and what
kinds of data and information an outside director can realistically
be expected to master and evaluate is the essence of the problem.
Some boundaries must be defined. In delineating those boundaries,
these factors are proposed for consideration:
1. A more realistic expectation of what the outside director
should be able to discern from financial data normally available to
him. This may be premised upon distinguishing between corporate
level and operational level information. In many instances, questionable activities and developments do not show on the face of
corporate level data. They can only be discerned by familiarity with
activities at the operational level, and imposition of legal responsi94. Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex CorporationRelating to
Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation,CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80, 219.
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bility for familiarity with the operational matters would seem questionable.
2. A more realistic distinction among the kinds of transactions
involved in evaluating the director's exercise of reasonable investigation. As an example, complete information as to the particulars
of mergers and acquisitions during the negotiationsphase would be
an exceedingly high standard for reasons suggested in the preceding
section.
3. A broadened scope of persons upon whom the outside director may rely for corporate information and assessment of corporate
developments. There should be limits to the extent to which the
outside director should be expected to perform what borders on a
policing function. This is a difficult area, to be sure, since in the
particular fact situation much depends upon other developments
having alerted the director to the need for special investigative efforts. However, in the normal course of corporate affairs, it would
seem that the outside director should be justified in relying extensively upon information and evaluation from internal sources.
To a considerable extent, these considerations have been recognized in the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code." The proposed code presents guidelines as to what may be
considered proper grounds for belief in connection with registration
statements, offering statements, and reports. It includes such factors as the type of defendant, the defendant's responsibility for any
fact or document incorporated by reference at the time of filing from
which it was incorporated, and whether a director or proposed director had any other relationship to the registrant. Most significantly,
the code would take into account reasonable reliance in certain
situations by directors, on officers, employees, and others whose
duties lead to knowledge of particular facts."
In conclusion, this writer suggests that a broad perspective
must be maintained in the area of legal standards of conduct of the
director. The concern about the availability of qualified and competent outside directors should not be lightly regarded. While investor
confidence is a value beyond question, there are other values in the
realm of corporate management in a dynamic business and economic system. Even Blough's laudable concept of a working director
has some limitations. If the amount of time, effort, and involvement
required approaches the level required to achieve that degree of
95.
1973).
96.
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familiarity with corporate affairs seemingly suggested by some, the
outside director, after all, would no longer be outside.
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